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The following research agenda is based on issues raised during recent visits to Azerbajan, 
Venezuela, Chile, and Nigeria concerning critical issues that they face in their policy 
dialogues, both internally, and with international financial institutions.   
 
1. Macroeconomics of resource management and sustainability 
(i) Debates in Azerbaijan centered around issues of the rate of expenditures and 
what moneys should be spent on.  One view, for instance, argued that the 
foreign exchange generated should only be spent on the foreign exchange 
component of investment projects; spending money on domestic resources, e.g. 
labor, was likely to lead to a Dutch disease problem, and in any case, so long as 
there were underutilized resources, foreign exchange was not required; domestic 
credit creation could be used for domestic resource mobilization. The pace of 
expenditure should be determined by the availability of high return projects, not 
by the availability of funds or some steady stream of expenditures.  The other 
view argued that there should be a steady rate of expenditures, that if there were 
an insufficiency of good projects, the government should use the funds to 
reduce taxes.   A through macroeconomic analysis of the appropriate rate and 
pattern of expenditure would help inform this debate. 
(ii) Accounting frameworks have been a major problem confronting several 
countries.  In Chile, for instance, after a stabilization fund was created, when the 
government sought to use money from the stabilization fund for countercyclical 
demand management, the expenditures were allegedly treated by the IMF as 
simply another form of deficit spending.  Chile worried that this both 
undermined the rationale for creating the fund and would hurt Chile in 
international markets.  They also argued that the accounting frameworks that 
were forcing privatization, regardless of the relative efficiency or social returns 
to private versus public ownership, GDP accounting frameworks that do not 
take account of the depletion of natural resources, or the privatization of 
government enterprises, may give a misleading indicator of the success of the 
economy and its sustainability.  Accounting frameworks are important in 
shaping decisions; distorted accounting will lead to distortions in policy 
decisions. A through analysis of these and other accounting issues is, I think, 
one of the key issues.  
2. Distributive Consequences 
In countries, like Venezuela, the benefits of the oil money go to a minority of the 
population.  Two thirds of the population remains in poverty.  It is this, perhaps more 
than anything, which has contributed to the political instability of that country.  We now 
have budgetary accounting frameworks that can be used to analyze the incidence of 
government oil expenditure.  The development and application of these tools to resource 
rich counties would contribute to the policy dialogue, and would help ensure the 
equitable distribution of revenue.  
 
3. Federalism 
In many countries, oil or mineral deposits are located in a limited area within the country, 
which has to bear the brunt of the environmental and social costs of extraction; but 
naturally the country believes that the revenues should be shared more generally.  In 
Nigeria, decisions about how revenues are to be shared and who should should make 
decisions on the usage of the revenues are inextricably linked with political decisions 
concerning decentralization and federalism.  At the very least, an analysis of the 
experiences of the different countries would be helpful in guiding countries working their 
way through these political issues.  
 
4. Contracting Leasing arrangements 
In many countries, there is a concern about a “fair” division of revenues between the 
country and its citizens and the foreign producers.  Even in the United States, with 
seemingly good “governance,” there has been concern about excessively rapid leasing 
having the effect of a “giveaway” during the Regan era, and in two important cases, oil 
companies have been convicted of, or agreed to out of court settlements effectively 
admitting, gross abuses in reporting of revenues for royalty purposes.  This has led to 
rethinking the design of auctions systems – looking for systems that are more 
“corruption” resistant.  Recent research and experience in auction theory has shown that 
different auction designs can have markedly different effects on the revenues raised by 
government.  There are two proposed interrelated research/policy papers. Part of this 
research project would look at the fraction of the “net back” price received for oil in 
different countries, and attempt to relate the price to the terms and design of the contract 
and the auction process. 
(i) Lessons on “cheating”:  The first would entail asking lawyers and economists 
involved in various litigation/contract disputes (Alaska, Alabama, the Caucasus) 
to provide a list, taxonomy, and an analysis of the various kinds of cheating and 
what can be done to minimize this cheating.1 
(ii) Auction design.  It is now recognized that is make a great deal of difference for 
the revenue raised by the government whether there is a royalty auction or a 
bonus bid auction.  Because of information externalities, the pattern of leasing 
(Alberta’s checkerboard leasing) too many have major effect on revenues 
raised. (See Stiglitz’s earlier work on information externalities in oil leasing.) 
The design of the spectrum auctions had a major effect in enhancing 
government revenues (see Milgrom).  In some places (including the U.S.) there 
has been concern that lease provisions lead to premature shutdown of wells, or 
in other cases, to excessively rapid extraction.  The lessons on “cheating” too 
have impacted thinking on auction design.  The task of this paper would be to 
develop “corruption resistant revenue maximizing auction systems.” And would 
include an analysis also of the pace and sequencing of leasing and the design of 
a variety of provisions to ensure efficiency and sustainability.  
                                                 
1 Jeff Leitzinger of Econ One and I worked together on the Alaska case.  
